I'm not sure but there seems to be some confusion here between the basic key structure spec & client UI oddities, this is what I understand & my rational for my above post:
TL>DR: Summary: protections on identity export & where/how you import need to be carefully defined & risky operations made difficult to find for users who are not explicitly aware of the risks. From the below, what do your export options actually mean & what is the UX restrictions present?
**In the below assume previous n Identity Unlock Keys (PIUKn) are assumed revokes & protected at rest by the user passphrase**
In the protocol key specification the root key is the Identity Unlock Key (IUK) which 256 bit, generated randomly & run through the Ed25519 make_private function to twittle a few bits to make it a private key, the associated public key Identity Lock Key is also generated. The IUK key when stored is encrypted using the Rescue_code as its passphrase, the ILK then is stored against the users provided passphrase & used during initial association to new sites to prime the ability to reKey later.
From the IUK the Master Key (MK) is generated using the EnHash function when stored it is encrypted against the user provided passphrase.
"Exporting an Identity" can be done a number of ways but not all of them are secure against expected threats. For example the following are possible (may be unsupported) export modes:-
1/ Export IUK alone unencrypted
2/ Export IUK encrypted against Rescue code
3/ Export IUK encrypted against Rescue code & MK / ILK unencrypted
4/ Export IUK encrypted against Rescue code & MK / ILK encrypted against user passphrase
5/ Export only MK / ILK unencrypted
6/ Export only MK / ILK encrypted against user passphrase
If we assume our initial device is secure & trusted (if it is not all bets are off anyway) then this is how I believe each mode should be utilised if available:-
1/ Should only ever be used as an offline export QR-Code printout or similar. This file should only ever be used for import to an offline trusted root device for identity recovery operations, leakage of this information constitutes an unrecoverable loss.
2/ Can be exported as QR-code or file & possibly stored online. This file should only ever be used for import to an offline trusted root device for identity recovery operations, leakage of information after decryption constitutes an unrecoverable loss.
3/ Should only ever be used as an offline export QR-Code printout or similar. This file should only ever be used for import to an offline trusted root device for identity recovery operations, leakage of the MK information constitutes an recoverable loss (via reKeying), leakage of the IUK see 1/
4/ Can be exported as QR-code or file & possibly stored online. This is the storage at rest condition for client devices, leakage of MK information after decryption constitutes an recoverable loss while leakage of the IUK is not revoverable, thus if the device is in any way suspect the rescue code should not be used.
5/ Should only ever be used as an offline export QR-Code printout or similar. I can be used to import identity to a trustworthy online device. Leakage of the information is a recoverable loss. I would not recommend this export if you cannot prevent 3rd party access to the hard copy. It cannot be used to reKey an identity because the IUK is not available.
6/ Can be exported as QR-code or file & possibly stored online. Leakage of MK information after decryption constitutes a recoverable loss. . It cannot be used to reKey an identity because the IUK is not available.